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Overcoming the Dysfunction 
of the Bifurcated Global System: 
The Promise of a Peoples Assembly 
Andrew L. Strauss 
INTRODUCTION 
Richard Falk and I have proposed that the time is ripe for global civil society to take the lead and ini-tiate a popularly representative Global Peoples Assembly (GPA).1 The tremendous growth in the commitment to, and practice of, democracy in 
domestic settings2 juxtaposed against globalization's large-scale transfer of 
political decision making to international institutions3 has made the almost 
complete lack of democracy at the international level the most glaring anomaly 
of the global system today. 
Because states are unlikely to initiate the democratization of the interna-
tional order, the task of beginning the drive for the first GPA necessarily falls 
to civil society.4 In taking up this cause, civil society could employ various 
strategies for bringing about such an assembly. For example, it could establish 
an embryonic assembly composed of representatives of civil society organiza-
tions with the goal that this body evolve into a popularly elected assembly. 
Alternatively, a very hopeful approach might be to enlist a relatively small core 
of like-minded states to create a treaty-based electoral assembly to which other 
countries could over time be persuaded to join. Falk and I have suggested that 
with the help of any willing states civil society could itself organize elections 
and establish the GPA. Quite clearly this strategy would entail overcoming for-
midable challenges. Civil society would have to come up with an institutional 
mechanism that would be broadly accepted for establishing electoral districts 
as well as campaign finance and other election rules. The fact that some of the 
world's more authoritarian governments would almost certainly not allow 
elections to occur in their countries would have to be dealt with. Until suffi-
cient pressure could be brought to bear, probably after the assembly was well 
established, citizens of these countries would most likely have to go unrepre-
sented. In other seemingly more receptive countries, civil society would have 
to guard against attempts to manipulate elections. Once the assembly was con-
stituted, meeting facilities, translation services, office support personnel, and 
other staff would have to be provided. All of this would call upon civil society 
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to~ore than it has ever done before. Nevertheless, in light of civil society:s 
recent successes in initiating global reform, Falk and I have suggested that 1t 
has the potential (we hope with the help of receptive states) to carry out such a 
project.5 
If a citizen-founded Global Peoples Assembly were in fact to become a 
twenty-first century reality, it would not, of course, immediately transform 
global governance. As the third section of this chapter will explain, i~ would 
rather establish an institutional structure that would have the potential over 
time to grow into a legislative body with accepted lawmaking powers. If such 
an assembly were eventually to evolve into one with a significant legislative 
role, global governance would likely be improved in several respects. In this 
chapter I will, however, only explore how the assembly could help overcome 
the most fundamental institutional dysfunctions of the current international 
system. To function effectively, any community legal system must be able to 
prescribe norms of behavior for the community.6 Once such norms are pre-
scribed, the system should be structured so as not to discourage internal com-
pliance,? and finally, the system should have the capacity to enforce its norms.8 
The international system in significant respects fails these most basic tests of 
functionality. 
At present, to a great extent in both theory and practice, elites who control 
the mechanisms of state power can choose for their states not to be bound by 
those international laws they do not wish it to be bound by, and even once 
bound, such elites maintain the internal ability to organize their citizenry to 
facilitate state noncompliance with the law when they deem it expedient. In 
response the international system is by and large unable to take effective reme-
dial action to enforce its norms against those individuals who are actually 
responsible for causing international law violations. What all this means as a 
practical matter is that those who control state power can on behalf of their 
states often de jure or de facto opt out of community law. 
In this chapter, I will trace the root of the dysfunction to what I call the 
bifurcated global system, by which I mean the rigid division of the global sys-
tem into two distinct polities, the domestic and the international. In place of 
what, with the help of a directly representative assembly, could be an unmedi-
ated democratic connection between the global citizenry and the international 
order, states at present intermediate this relationship. Not only does this result 
in citizen access to international lawmaking power being channeled through 
states, but correspondingly, with rare exception, states, at the expense of the 
international order, maintain a captive monopoly on the legal obligations of 
citizens. Instead of a seamless democratic global legal system where no one is 
above the law, what results is a dysfunctional system that allows states to stand 
in contravention of the law, a system, to paraphrase John Adams, of states and 
not of laws.9 Tracing the origins of this dysfunction of the international system 
and understanding how a cure might be found in the promise of a Peoples 
Assembly is the subject of what follows. 
THE DYSFUNCTION 
OF THE BIFURCATED GLOBAL SYSTEM AND 
THE PROMISE OF THE GLOBAL PEOPLES ASSEMBLY 
STATE INTERMEDIATION 
AND THE BIFURCATED GLOBAL SYSTEM 
The global system as presently structured relies on states to be intermediaries 
between citizens and the international system. This means that the planet's six 
billion citizens are not directly involved in creating international law, and the 
international legal order, likewise, does not directly command their compli-
ance with its laws. Because law, domestic or international, can only affect the 
social order to the extent it influences the behavior of real human beings, the 
process of both creating and complying with international law necessarily 
must take place in two steps. With some recent qualification, I 0 if citizens wish 
to influence the creation of international law, they must petition their own 
government, which can, if it chooses, respond favorably to their appeal and 
wor~ toward the creation of such law. 
Once a state has agreed to a law, it must command real persons to do, or to 
refrain from doing, whatever is necessary to bring itself into compliance with 
the law. If states wish to establish an effective international regime banning the 
production of ozone-harming chemicals, for example, they must first enter 
into an agreement making such chemicals illegal under international law, and 
then each must preclude the real individuals within its jurisdiction from pro-
ducing such chemicals. Sometimes the demands might be upon individuals 
who are acting as agents of the states either by direct employment or by com-
mercial contract. For example, if two countries wish mutually to reduce their 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons, they must first enter into an international legal 
agreement among themselves to do so, and then each country must make the 
requisite demands upon the individuals involved in their respective defense 
establishments so that compliance with the agreement is achieved. Alterna-
tively, if these two countries wish to agree to create a military alliance with each 
other, they would enter into an international legal agreement and then com-
mand those individuals in their respective defense establishments to act in such 
a way that the terms of the alliance were met. 
THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY AND THE DYSFUNCTION 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING SYSTEM 
This bifurcated system, requiring states to intermediate between citizens and 
the international order, is quite dysfunctional. It charges states with setting the 
rules for the international system, II including the foundational rules that 
determine the extent to which states are imposed upon to comply with com-
munity norms.12 States have used this power to further their ability to maintain 
absolute discretion over the extent of their participation in the system. States, 
or more precisely those who control state power, have done this by adopting a 
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rule that allows each state to decide for itself which international laws it wishes 
to be bound by.1 3 Thus, for example, a state is under no legal obligation to 
agree to be bound by community laws that are necessary to the safety and well-
being of the international community. Overtures by the international commu-
nity to get states to join in pollution control, weapons elimination, or other 
regimes that are vital to the interests of the global community can all be 
rejected legally. 
The implications of this for the international system are significant. Just as 
would-be bank robbers are among the least likely citizens to agree voluntarily 
to subject themselves to domestic laws proscribing bank robbery, those states 
contemplating action contrary to an international law are the least likely to 
assent to that law. For example, India's 1995 refusal to agree to be bound by the 
nuclear nonproliferation treatyl4 might well have foretold its intention to 
become the newest avowed nuclear power. IS When, after three years, this came 
to pass, it precipitated a dangerous arms race in South Asia. 16 
The problems caused by the ability of states to opt out of community 
norms, however, go beyond the system's inability to extend the law to a limited 
number of recalcitrant countries. Because treaties are often ineffective without 
the participation of certain, and sometimes most, countries, a defiant minority 
can effectively veto the introduction of treaties that are in the vital interest of 
the world community. This is the practical, but reversible, effect of the United 
States' refusal thus far to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,I7 the treaty that establishes 
binding limits on greenhouse gases. 18 The failure to achieve this treaty could 
have major adverse implication for the global climate, l9 but going forward with 
a treaty makes no sense without participation by most countries and especially 
the United States, which accounts for over twenty-five percent of the world's 
greenhouse gases.20 
To only focus on obvious failures-the refusal of individual states to accede 
to international norms, or the potential for a minority of states to effectively 
veto a treaty-is still to understate the dysfunctionality of the present system. 
Given the intransigence that so many states exhibit in so many different types 
of negotiations, when broad-based agreements capable of securing general 
adherence are reached, it is often done at the cost of sacrificing a treaty's true 
effectiveness. So riddled with ambiguities and exceptions or reservations, for 
example, are conventions to protect women, such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women2l and the Convention Con-
cerning Equal Remuneration,22 that these lowest common denominator 
instruments are severely compromised in their effectiveness. 
An effective Global Peoples Assembly would go a long way toward remedy-
ing this dysfunction of the international lawmaking system. The delegates to 
the Global Peoples Assembly, unlike national elites who control the mecha-
nisms of state power, would not have an interest in promoting unfettered dis-
cretion by states over whether or not they are to be bound by international 
legal obligations. Therefore, as distinct from the current international legisla-
----------------~====~========~ 
tive system controlled exclusively by states, a Global Peoples Assembly, com-
mitted to the rule of law, would be much more predisposed to proclaim a func-
tional system of binding law that states could not opt out of. Supporting the 
right of the assembly to issue such a proclamation and legitimizing it in the 
pUblic mind would be the fundamental democratic principle that the ultimate 
pOwer to create law flows from the consent of the governed, and that states do 
not have the discretion to opt out of law that is authorized by the higher 
authority of the citizenry.23 If the GPA were over time to become an accepted 
part of the international lawmaking system, possibly integrated into an 
expanded United Nations, such a proclamation could become accepted as a 
fundamental legal precept of the international system. After all, what appears 
so obvious in a domestic setting-that no functional legal system can give its 
subjects the individual discretion to opt out of laws they do not like-should, 
once officially proclaimed, come to appear obvious in the international setting 
as well. 
THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY AND THE DYSFUNCTION 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMPLIANCE SYSTEM 
Once a state consents to be bound by an international law, it is obliged to fol-
low that law. But here too, the system remains dysfunctional. Although states 
at this point no longer have the legal right not to comply with community 
norms, the bifurcated system is specifically designed to give them the practical 
ability to do just that. Because states (with one significant emerging excep-
tion)24 continue to be the sole source of law applicable to citizens, they main-
tain the ability to mobilize their citizens to directly contravene their interna-
tionallegal obligations. 
Securing institutional compliance with law is different from securing the 
compliance of individuals because institutional action that is intended to be 
either in conformity or not in conformity with the law is itself largely organ-
ized and coordinated through rules.25 States wishing to maintain centralized 
control over their compliance with international law must, therefore, come up 
with some legal mechanism for coordinating the actions of their citizens in the 
furtherance of directing either compliance or noncompliance with interna-
tionallaw. There are different doctrinal approaches used by states to accom-
plish this. The United States follows a particular application of what is called 
dualism, which maintains-consistent with the bifurcation of the interna-
tional system-that international law and domestic law are two totally distinct 
systems of law.26 International law applies between states, and domestic law 
applies within states. The American approach, however, provides that interna-
tionallaw is automatically incorporated into U.S. federal law so that it becomes 
the law of the United StatesP This means that, in the normal course, when 
political authorities desire for international law to be followed, they simply 
allow for such incorporation. However, since U.S. domestic law holds that a 
later-in-time federal law takes precedence over an earlier-in-time federallaw,28 
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by passing legislation29 inconsistent with a previous international legal obliga-
tion, the United States political branches can effectively direct those subject to 
its jurisdiction to violate international law. 
Some other countries give internal precedence, to a greater or lesser extent, 
to international law over their domestic law. Those that give precedence as a 
general rule to international law are referred to as "monist:' All countries are 
ultimately "dualist," however, in the sense that as a result of the bifurcated 
international system, their own governing institutions (often their constitu-
tions) are the ultimate determiners of which law will be given precedence. As 
long as it remains the case that states maintain ultimate control over their own 
internal compliance with international law, they will have the option of organ-
izing their citizens so as to promote the violation of international law. 
In a legal system organized to maximize law compliance, such an option 
would not exist. For example, within the domestic realm, corporations are 
somewhat analogous to states in the international realm in that each entity is 
self-governed through a system of internal rules and yet operates within the 
context of a larger community legal system. In all countries, however, the larger 
community legal system attempts to secure the legal obedience of these corpo-
rate entities by imposing compliance obligations not only upon them but also 
upon those employees who work within their structures.30 Indeed, we would 
regard it as quite illogical for the state to limit intentionally the effectiveness of 
its ability to secure compliance with its mandates. 
A Global Peoples Assembly would very likely improve the international 
compliance system by extending the obligation to obey international law 
directly to individuals. Unlike the national governing elites who, acting as 
agents of their states, have colluded to maintain an international system 
whereby their claims on citizen legal obligations are uncontested, a GPA dedi-
cated to an effective system of law would be inclined to proclaim transnational 
law to be binding on citizens. Correspondingly citizens who directly participate 
in the international system would likely come to accept and even expect that 
the law their assembly creates would apply directly to them. 
To the extent such law actually comes to be generally accepted by citizens as 
applicable, in what could be labeled "compliance from the inside out:' states 
would lose the ability to mobilize their citizens in contravention of transnational 
law. The old system would be turned on its head. States would no longer, as under 
the bifurcated system, be the vehicle that must be relied upon to bring their citi-
zens into compliance with international legal obligations. Instead, because states 
are in effect the sum of their citizens, citizen compliance with international legal 
obligations would necessarily result in state compliance as well. 
THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY AND THE DYSFUNCTION 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM 
Not only does the bifurcated system facilitate the organizational ability of 
states to break international law in the first instance, but it does not allow for 
an effective remedial system of enforcement. Under the bifurcated system, 
states rather than individuals are the exclusive subjects of international law, so 
enforcement is with rare exception31 both against states and by states. 
Enforcement against states takes several forms. The most far-reaching 
enforcement powers are given to the United Nations Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.32 Under Chapter VII, the Security 
Council has a right either to impose economic sanctions33 or use military 
force34 against a nation whenever it determines "the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."35 More narrowly focused 
treaty organizations also have certain enforcement powers. For example, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) can authorize members to introduce retal-
iatory trade restrictions against other states that have violated one of the agree-
ments enforceable by the WTO, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade.36 Other organizations, such as the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), rely on criticizing the practices of countries, or what is sometimes 
referred to as the "mobilization of shame;' in attempts to enforce their 
normsY What these international enforcement practices all have in common, 
however, is that the state itself is the unit upon which enforcement is targeted. 
Such enforcement against an artificial person as complex and diffuse as a 
state is both ineffective and violative of basic human rights. Elites who control 
state power and can cause international law violations often personally benefit 
or are responsive to those who personally benefit when their country violates 
international law. Whether they or those to whom they are beholden actually 
benefit, those elites are seldom forced to face personally the consequences of 
their actions. If they hail from powerful states, their ability to mobilize the 
machinery of their own state against international enforcers can remove the 
possibility that any enforcement action will be taken or, if taken, that it can 
have any significant affect on their state. Those individuals from less powerful 
countries who cause violations usually fare as well. While their countries may 
be the target of international enforcement action, with their social power 
comes the capacity to insulate themselves from the effects of such action. This 
seems particularly true in the more authoritarian countries where leaders can 
successfully insulate themselves from the effects of negative public opinion. 
Perversely, those who have little responsibility for engineering violations of 
international law often bear the brunt of enforcement action. Obviously, this 
significandy limits the deterrent effect of the international enforcement sys-
tem.38 In addition, collective punishment is contrary to accepted notions of 
human rights.39 Even for those who, inconsistendy with international law and 
accepted notions· of justice, would have it that citizen passivity in the face of 
violations of international law or even widespread acquiescence in following 
the commands of the state calls for some type of collective responsibility, the 
bifurcated compliance and enforcement systems taken together are internally 
inconsistent. The compliance system, as I have discussed, makes no attempt to 
pierce the veil of the state to extend its legal obligations to common citizens. 
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Thus, citizens under the present system are in effect held collectively responsi-
ble for violating laws that they were not expected to comply with in the first 
place. 
Nowhere has the dysfunction of the international enforcement system 
become more clear than in the United Nations Security Council-authorized 
war and the ten-year-long sanctions regime against Iraq. Perhaps indicative of 
the overall state of the international enforcement system, this is frequently 
thought of as a great example of successful international enforcement because 
Iraq was dislodged from Kuwait.4o During the war, however, hundreds if not 
thousands of Iraqi conscripts were killed,41 almost all of whom, of course, had 
no role in the decision to invade Kuwait. While the Iraqi dictator is reported to 
be profiting from smuggling opportunities made possible by the sanctions 
regime42 (which has been ineffective at meeting its political objectives),43 many 
Iraqi children are reported to have died as a direct result of the sanctions.44 
Obviously, any enforcement system that systematically sanctions the innocent 
rather than the infractors is both perversely unjust and deficient in promoting 
law-abiding behavior. 
Compounding the dysfunction of this system where enforcement is almost 
entirely against states is the symmetrical reality that enforcement is almost 
entirely by states. Under the bifurcated system, states largely stand between the 
international order and the real persons whose activities are ultimately neces-
sary to carry out enforcement measures. The international order only main-
tains direct but limited control over a small number of international civil ser-
vants composed mostly of technical specialists. For example, when the United 
Nations Security Council takes action under Chapter VII, the organization 
itself has no direct means of enforcing economic sanctions or applying force 
against a country.45 Rather, it must rely upon its state members who are alone 
capable of mobilizing citizens to carry out enforcement measures. In the Gulf 
War Chapter VII action against Iraq, the United Nations Security Council 
"authorized" what was effectively the United States, Britain, France, and Saudi 
Arabia to "use all necessary means" to get Iraq out of Kuwait,46 and it is prima-
rily American naval ships that have been enforcing the oil sanctions against 
Iraq.47 Practical proposals to enhance the independent enforcement abilities of 
the international order have mostly fallen on the deaf ears of states (particu-
larly powerful states) committed to maintaining the prerogatives that come 
with the strict bifurcation of the global order. 48 
Under such a system, the imposition of enforcement measures becomes 
highly politicized. In determining whether enforcement measures will actually 
be imposed against an infractor, such legitimate considerations as the severity 
of a violation, the future danger posed by the infractor, or its past incorrigibil-
ity are weighed against the geopolitical and other interests of would-be enforc-
ing states. Strategic alliances, business considerations, the ethnic identifications 
of domestic constituencies, and the general diplomatic and military power of 
the infractors can individually or collectively conspire to preclude enforcement 
in any given case. Not only does the politicization of the enforcement system 
compromise enforcement in individual cases, but to the extent states can pre-
dict that no action will be taken against them, the enforcement system loses its 
ability to deter violations. Perhaps most importantly, such politicization 
undermines the perception that law rather than politics guides the interna-
tional enforcement system, greatly frustrating the creation of an international 
ethic of respect for the rule of law. 
An empowered Global Peoples Assembly could remedy both of these dys-
functions. If, as suggested, a GPA dedicated to the creation of a fully functional 
international system were to extend the obligation to comply with transna-
tional law directly to individuals, presumably it would correspondingly pro-
vide that that law be enforced against them as well. Then, in accordance with 
principles of fairness and deterrence, those actually responsible for law-break-
ing would themselves be the target of legal sanctions, and the ability of states to 
mobilize their citizens in contravention of the law would be further eroded. In 
addition, with a GPA, enforcement would no longer have to be dependent 
upon the vacillating willingness of states to undertake enforcement action. 
Over time, an empowered GPA would have the potential to directly authorize 
an international infrastructure to enforce international law directly. While 
visions of a standing army come to mind, this would be by far the most contro-
versial enforcement mechanism that might come to be considered by the GPA. 
Most direct enforcement would be far more everyday and mundane. Armies of 
bureaucrats rather than soldiers would be the most likely to be marshaled and 
would in many ways provide a far more effective and hopeful vision for the 
future. To the extent that the bifurcated structure of the international order 
begins to break down and international law comes to be directly enforced 
against citizens, the state will begin to lose its ability to break international law. 
With the growth of a more law-abiding world, it is to be hoped that standing 
armies will become a much less prominent feature of the global architecture. 
FULFILLING THE PROMISE: THE EMPOWERMENT 
OF THE GLOBAL PEOPLES ASSEMBLY 
It is, of course, one matter for a citizen-created Global Peoples Assembly to 
proclaim internationally prescribed regulation to be binding, applicable to citi-
zens, and directly enforceable on citizens by international institutions. It is 
quite another matter for such proclamations to become institutional reality. To 
counter the impression that the creation of an assembly-led seamless global 
legal system, while perhaps desirable, is purely in the realm of the utopian, I 
will now explain how such a transformation could over time become a reality. 
As Richard Falk and I explain elsewhere,49 the ideological underpinnings of 
the global political order were at one time based upon the divine right of kings. 
The bifurcation of the international order arose because monarchs who per-
sonified the state were thought to be the fundamental repository of all worldly 
political authority. Under this conceptual structure monarchs were empowered 
:IE 
... 
I-
'" >-
'" 
... 
e( 
UI 
o 
... 
eI 
Q 
... 
l-
e( 
V 
'" :::>
... 
UI 
... 
:z: 
I-
... 
o 
z 
o 
l-
V 
Z 
:::> 
... 
'" >-
Q 
... 
:z: 
I-
eI 
Z 
:IE 
o 
v 
'" ... 
> 
o 
I/) 
I/) 
:::> 
< 
II< 
l-
I/) 
~ 
... 
II< 
Q 
Z 
< 
to lord over their subjects below and to become the exclusive progenitors of the 
inter-state order above. As a result of a fundamental paradigm shift that has 
occurred, beginning over two hundred years ago, however, political authority is 
no longer thought to come directly from an absolutist ruler. 50 Rather, people 
today increasingly accept the notion that political authority comes from the 
citizens who are called upon to validate political leadership through periodic 
elections.51 While the state maintains its role as the final political authority, 
what is different is that this authority is now delegated from its ultimate source, 
the citizenry. This means that if citizens were to circumvent the state and them-
selves create an elected transnational authority to which they would directly 
delegate certain transnational powers, the state could no longer lay ideological 
claim to be the sole source of all international political authority. For the first 
time, an international institution would have a basis of authority separate from 
that which has been derived from the consent of states. 
The Global Peoples Assembly's democratic foundation, however, would not 
immediately translate into the kind of binding powers that would end the dys-
function of the international system. Traditional political and bureaucratic 
structures reinforcing state power and the established notion that international 
law is created by states would not automatically transform themselves with the 
mere realization of the Global Peoples Assembly. Rather, at first the assembly as 
a nongovernmental institution would likely be regarded, at least within official 
circles, as only empowered to issue unofficial and nonbinding resolutions and 
declarations. In what Falk and I refer to as the "socio-political and ideological 
dynamics of empowerment:' however, the assembly would hopefully come to 
achieve its democratic potential. 52 
What we mean by sociopolitical empowerment are those social and political 
dynamics that would be unleashed by the existence of the assembly and would 
enhance its ultimate ability to command authority. This process of sociopoliti-
cal empowerment would begin with the first elections. Born amidst the public-
ity that would result from worldwide citizen participation in elections and 
uniquely capable of speaking in the name of the global citizenry, the assembly 
would act as a magnet drawing organized interests with globally oriented pol-
icy agendas into its field. Civil society organizations, in particular those that, as 
I have mentioned, have been frustrated in their attempts to participate in the 
state-centric international system, would likely take advantage of the demo-
cratic opportunity afforded by such an assembly. By lobbying the GPA to 
endorse their positions formally, these organizations would force states and 
others with opposing policy goals to either concede the legitimacy afforded by 
the only popularly elected global body or to themselves competitively engage 
its processes. 
Our experience of parliamentarian ism writ large tells us that as transnational 
citizen groups organize to petition the assembly directly, they would form coali-
tions with other like-minded citizen groups for the purpose of more effectively 
challenging other similarly coalescing groupS.53 As the organized citizenry 
\ 
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increasingly came to find the Global Peoples Assembly useful as its forum for 
resolving political conflict of a global nature and achieving a workable social 
consensus, the center of political gravity would gradually shift in favor of the 
GPA. Allowed for the first time to participate in the international lawmaking 
process directly, the organized citizenry would tend to become institutionally 
committed to the Assembly and invested in its legislative product. 
The citizenry at large would as well tend to be drawn into the assembly's 
field. The need for candidates for the assembly to appeal to the electorate would 
naturally incorporate it into the global system. Discussions that once were con-
sidered the elite province of foreign relations specialists and in which citizens 
could at best participate indirectly at the national level would be as a matter of 
course broadened to incorporate the newly enfranchised citizenry as a whole. 
Still, this political vitality would not in itself mean that the assembly would gain 
the power to create binding law applicable and enforceable in the ways called 
for in this chapter. This would potentially result, however, from the addition of 
what Falk and I call the ideological dynamic of empowerment, the acceptance 
of the assembly's democratic claim to exercise legal authority by those existing 
institutions that are themselves imbued with formal lawmaking powers.54 
Domestic courts are the most obvious of such institutions. Certainly at least 
a few pioneering litigants with the institutional backing of the assembly's sup-
porters, or simply because such arguments would be helpful to their cause, 
would begin to cite the assembly's directives as authoritative. On the pages of 
law journals, academic supporters of the assembly could be counted on to pro-
vide the rationale for this position by applying globally the familiar arguments 
supporting the legal powers of democratic assemblies. If the assembly were in 
fact gaining the institutional allegiance of the citizenry, some of the bolder pro-
gressive judges in open societies would be tempted to be among the first to 
accept this democratic 10gic.55 To the extent judicial acceptance were to occur,56 
the ideological coherence underlying the doctrine of dualism would be eroded, 
and with such erosion the state's political authorities would lose from within 
their absolute control over the state's ability to violate international law. 
Other lawmaking institutions could as well help solidify the assembly's de 
jure legislative authority. Acceptance of the assembly's powers by international 
courts and tribunals would put pressure on state executive and political deci-
sion makers to recognize the assembly's authority. Further pressure could come 
from the assembly's efforts to lobby governments on its own behalf as well as 
from a GPA-organized international plebiscite putting approval of the assem-
bly's powers to the global citizenry. 
Some national parliaments or their equivalents might unilaterally accept the 
assembly's powers. However, the definitive event would be when states, the pri-
mary entities with a rival claim to power, act collectively to formally recognize 
the assembly's legislative authority. This could be done by way of a treaty offi-
cially defining the assembly's powers as part of the overall constitutional struc-
ture of the United Nations system of global governance. This, of course, would 
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not happen solely as a result of the compelling logic in favor of the assembly's 
democratic authority, but rather out of an acceptance of a new political reality 
that sees citizens increasingly coming together to resolve political conflict and 
achieve social consensus within the framework of the Global Peoples Assembly. 
As this citizen heart of pluralist decision making migrates in the direction of 
the Global Peoples Assembly, governments would only be acknowledging a 
reality over which they had little direct control. 
If a Global Peoples Assembly were to be established at the instigation of civil 
society, it is, of course, impossible to know if it would develop in the ways sug-
gested. Much would depend upon serendipity and the competence and 
integrity of the representatives who came to be identified with the assembly. 
There are historical reasons, however, to be optimistic that the dynamics I have 
suggested would play themselves out in ways that would empower the assem-
bly. After all, the venerable English Parliament began as but an advisory body 
to the Crown. Nevertheless, as the democratic ideal took hold its status as the 
representative of the people secured its eventual supremacy. Moreover, in our 
own time there is indeed precedent for a transnational assembly along the lines 
of a GPA. The directly elected European Parliament, although once a largely 
symbolic representative of the peoples of the European Union, has today 
attained significant law making powers.57 What is more, it is the national gov-
ernments of the European Union that have acted primarily on their own initia-
tive to create and strengthen that institution. 
Perhaps the most significant force that would propel the eventual empower-
ment of a GPA is the sheer need for such an organization. The global system is 
dysfunctional, and as globalization proceeds, the need to find transnational 
solutions to once local problems continues to accelerate. 58 As the recent 
protests in Seattle have made clear,59 citizens are increasingly unlikely to con-
tinue willingly to allow themselves to be excluded from the global decision-
making process. Political and commercial elites attempting to solve global reg-
ulatory problems are, therefore, increasingly likely themselves to come to 
accept the need for some kind of innovation along the lines of the GPA. 
If indeed a GPA does come to pass, and if its authority is to evolve in accor-
dance with some rough approximation of what has been described, then over 
time, it could carry out what has been called for in this chapter as necessary to 
overcome the dysfunction of the international system: make international laws 
that are binding, applicable to citizens, and directly enforceable on citizens. 
CONCLUSION 
Some will regard the ability of a popularly elected Global Peoples Assembly to 
seriously remedy the major dysfunctions of the international system as a hope-
lessly utopian dream. I have done my best to respond. Others, however, might 
come to the opposite conclusion. They might see the GPA as a potentially dan-
gerous Leviathan paving the way toward world domination. In concluding, I 
would like to briefly address this concern. 
A word of qualification is first in order. It is far beyond the scope of this 
chapter to suggest in any detail the structure of a Global Peoples Assembly. 
While future academic works exploring alternative models would be useful, the 
ultimate framework for a GPA must, of course, be determined by democratic 
process, and at any rate, as the analysis in this chapter makes clear, a GPA born 
of citizen initiative would very much be a constitutional work-in-progress. The 
role it would eventually settle into playing in the overall global order would not 
be known for many years. 
Having said all this, to propose a Global Peoples Assembly endowed with 
certain lawmaking powers is not the same as to suggest an all-powerful sover-
eignlike organization. Such a model would likely be unacceptable to just about 
everyone. The template that would achieve the most support would likely be 
drawn from some sort of federalist or confederalist model. In accordance with 
what the Europeans call "subsidiarity"-the principle by which decisions are 
made as closely as possible to the citizen6°-the assembly's powers would be 
limited in such a way as to protect autonomy over national matters.61 Indeed, 
such deference to internal affairs is the vision presently endorsed by Article 2, 
Section 7 of the United Nations Charter.62 Likewise, given the present commit-
ment to international human rights, the international community is likely to 
insist that an empowered assembly be limited by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.63 How these rights would be enforced as well as the GPA's rela-
tionship with the United Nations and other international organizations and 
tribunals would all have to be determined. 
Would there be any absolute guarantees that despite the best of intentions 
such an assembly would not help pave the way toward a consolidation of power 
that could be fundamentally threatening to freedom? Probably not. However, it 
seems clear from political theory, experience at the national level, and indeed 
common sense that democratic outcomes are most likely to proceed from 
democratic structures. In addition to any structural checks and balances estab-
lished, the assembly's legitimacy would be grounded in popular democracy 
and its usefulness as a forum for pluralist decision making rather than loyalty 
to a sovereign, an authoritarian ideology, or nationalism. Such an institution 
would be difficult to convert to authoritarian ends without losing the norma-
tive command over citizen legal obligations upon which, as previously dis-
cussed, the institution's authority ultimately depends. 
That the present international order is, in contrast, not structured to allow 
for democratic participation has been the basic premise of this chapter. What 
may be less obvious, however, is the extent to which the bifurcated system is 
configured to allow authoritarian governance to persist at the national level. In 
the first place, national governments, whether they be democratic or not, con-
tinue in their role as the ultimate and exclusive focal points for citizens' legal 
obligations. Even to the extent that national governments come to embody the 
democratic spirit, such a bifurcated system of discrete democracies channels 
citizen legal obligations so that state-defined societies are structurally juxta-
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posed to each other. Coercion of one society by another ultimately backed by 
the ever-present threat (and often use) of military violence is an inherent fea-
ture of this bifurcated structure. Such architecture is, of course, the antithesis 
of seamless democratic governance which results when an integrated demo-
cratic structure is designed to protect the rights and security of everyone. To 
make matters worse, in truth even the best of discrete democracies cannot 
enjoy an insulated fully functional democratic existence. The democratic 
health of every society will be to some extent compromised by national secu-
rity concerns as long as the bifurcated system predetermines an ever-present 
threat from other societies. 
On balance, therefore, it seems far more likely that a democratic future will 
be attained with the implementation of democratic structures at the interna-
tionallevel than without. As this chapter has suggested, the bifurcated system 
that provides that states be the ultimate focus of citizen's legal obligations is a 
remnant from a previous era when absolutist national rulers were accepted as 
divinely mandated with supreme and absolute power. In the modern demo-
cratic view it is commonly held that within states political power at all levels of 
governance must directly involve the citizenry. It is time these basic democratic 
principles were applied to the international order. As more political decision 
making takes place within the confines of the undemocratic international 
order, to continue to leave this anomaly unchallenged is to lose ground in the 
quest for democracy and to see the dysfunction of the bifurcated system 
become increasingly debilitating. 
NOTES 
1. See Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, "On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: 
Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty;' Stanford Journal of International 
Law, 36, 2000, 191ff. (hereafter "On the Creation"). See also Richard Falk and Andrew 
Strauss, "Globalization Needs a Dose of Democracy," International Herald Tribune, 
October 5, 1999, 8; Andrew Strauss and Richard Falk, "For a Global Peoples Assembly," 
International Herald Tribune, November 14, 1997,8; and Andrew Strauss and Richard 
Falk, "All That Dough," Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 12, 1997,7. 
2. Over the last thirty years there has been a significant global trend toward democratiza-
tion. It started in southern Europe in the mid-1970s, engulfed Latin America in the 
1980s, and expanded to many parts of Asia, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, 
and Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to Freedom House, 117 coun-
tries-more than sixty percent of the world's states-are now, at least in a qualified 
sense, democratic. See Adrian Karatnycky, 'The Comparative Survey of Freedom 
1998-1999: A Good Year for Freedom;' in Freedom House: The Annual Survey of Politi-
cal Rights and Civil Liberties 1998-1999 (New York: Freedom House, 1999), 1, 3. 
Reporting on and interpreting this trend toward democracy has not surprisingly been a 
major theme among commentators. Receiving perhaps the most notoriety has been 
Harvard poHtical scientist Samuel Huntington, who, in 1993, introduced the concept of 
waves of democratic expansion and surveyed the advance of democracy around the 
world. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the 
Late Twentieth Century, Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series, Vol. 4 (Uni-
versity of Oklahoma Press, 1993). At about the same time, a related work by Thomas 
Franck received a great deal of attention within the international law community. 
Franck, the recently retired president of the American Society of International Law, cel-
ebrated this trend toward democratization by suggesting that international law was in 
the process of evolving a right to democratic governance. See Thomas M. Franck, 'The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," American Journal of International Law 86, 
1992. While the global trend toward democratization heralded by Huntington and 
Franck continues, or certainly has not lost significant ground, scholars have more 
recently begun to give greater emphasis to the frailties of existing democratic systems 
and the potential limits on the further expansion of democracy. See Samuel P. Hunt-
ington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1996) (asserting that democratic expansion is limited by its connection 
to Western cultures); Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, 
Nov.!Dec. 1997, 22 (observing that despite electoral validation, many governments 
maintain authoritarian systems of administration); Thomas Carothers, "Democracy 
without Illusions," Foreign Affairs, Jan.!Feb. 1997,85 (discussing the countermovement 
away from democracy). 
3. Many observers perceive this evolution of power to the international order. For some 
important works, see Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in 
the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),49 (arguing that 
state power is giving way to the power of global institutions and multinational corpo-
rations); Christoph Schreuer, "The Waning of the Sovereign State: Toward a New Para-
digm for International Law?" European Journal of International Law, 4, 1993,447,451 
(discussing the increasing independence from their state constituents of such interna-
tional organizations as the World Health Organization, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the World Trade Organization); Robert J. Holton, Globalization and the 
Nation-State (London: Palgrave, 1998), 50-79 (noting the evolution toward transna-
tional networks and regulatory arrangements) . 
4. Now surfacing are several preliminary but important citizen efforts to create an institu-
tion similar to wnat we are calling the Global Peoples Assembly. Out of Perugia, Italy, 
an initiative called the Assembly of the United Nations of Peoples has attempted to 
organize civil society organizations into a quasi-representative assembly. In 1998, with 
civil society organizations from one hundred countries in attendance, it had its third 
assembly. Similarly significant is the Global Peoples Assembly Movement, which had its 
inaugural meeting in Samoa in April 2000. Like the Perugia initiative, this movement's 
purpose is to create an ongoing institutional structure that would allow the global citi-
zenry to have an effective voice in global governance. The civil society organization, 
Citizen Century, launched a major effort to begin an organizational drive to link all the 
national parliamentarians of the world together over the Internet into a voting body. In 
addition, a major discussion is currently going on within the World Federalist Associa-
tion on whether it should return to its roots and itself participate in an organizing drive 
for a Global Peoples Assembly. Perhaps most important, and linking all of these initia-
tives, was the Millennium NGO Forum. At the invitation of the United Nations Secre-
tary General, representatives of hundreds of civil society organizations convened in 
May at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. One of the primary stated goals 
of the forum was "to create an organizational structure whereby peoples of the world 
can participate effectively in global decision-making." The forum's outcome was 
reported on by the Secretary General at the special millennial assembly of states which 
examined the future architecture of the global system of governance. 
5. See Falk and Strauss, "On the Creation." 
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Ibid., 86. 
See John Adams, Papers ofJohn Adams, volume 2, edited by Robert J. Taylor et al. (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977),314. 
Nongovernmental organizations, often now referred to as civil society organizations, 
are increasingly attempting to bypass the nation-state and participate directly at the 
international level. For further discussion, see generally Peter J. Spiro, "New Global 
Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making 
Institutions:' Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995,45; Dianne Otto, "Nongovernmental 
Organizations in tlle United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil 
Society," Human Rights Quarterly, 18, 1996, 107; Dinah Shelton, "The Participation of 
Non-Governmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings:' American 
Journal of International Law, 88, 1994. While international organizations have been 
reluctantly and tentatively opening their doors to citizen organizations, within the logic 
of the present international system, constituted as a community of states rather than 
citizens, there is no clear structural role for citizen organizations to play. 
11. The dominant view is that under the bifurcated international legal system, interna-
tionallaw emanates from the general consent of states. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, "Inter-
national Law: Politics, Values and Functions," Recueil des COUTS 216, 1989, 46 (pro-
claiming that "[iJnter-state law is made, or recognized, or accepted, by the 'will' of 
States. Nothing becomes law for the international system from any other source"). This 
view, while generally endorsed by those who control the mechanisms of state power, 
has been contested. See Myres McDougal et al., Studies in World Public Order, New 
Haven Studies in International Law and World Public Order, no. 1 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1960); Richard Fa\k, Law in an Emerging Global Village: A Post-West-
phalian Perspective (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1998). 
12. See Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 11-13 (explaining why the international community of states as a "rule 
community" has created its own process for making and applying rules and resolving 
disputes about their meaning). 
13. Generally speaking, states have accepted the view that they are only bound by those 
international laws to which they agree, either explicitly by treaty or impliedly by cus-
tomary practice. This statement, however, draws upon a long tradition of discussion 
and debate and is subject to some qualification. First, in regard to customary interna-
tionallaw, states have traditionally maintained that they are only bound by customary 
laws that they accept. The generally accepted requirement, however, for manifesting a 
lack of consent ("the persistent objector rule") demands that states declare their inten-
tion not to be bound by a customary law at the time of the formation of the law. For a 
variety of reasons, this is sufficiently unlikely to happen that, practically speaking, most 
of the time states are considered bound by customary international law. Second, and 
more fundamentally, there has been an increasing, although seldom articulated, trend 
toward viewing customary international law as binding on even tllOse states that have 
stated a desire not to be bound based upon a subtle shift to the notion that a general 
consensus among states binds all states. For further discussion, see J. Patrick Kelly, "The 
Twilight of Customary International Law," Virginia Journal of International Law, 40, 
2000, 449. Most states, however, do not seem to accept this view. 
Treaties are to an ever greater extent replacing customary international law as the 
primary source of legal obligations on states. Whether a state wishes to adhere to a 
treaty is, under the state-created rules of the international system, always voluntary. 
Here, however, some qualification is also in order. While a state always has the legal 
option to resist a treaty, as a practical matter, in certain cases diplomatic pressure may 
be such that a state actually has little option but to accept a treaty. For a discussion of 
this problem, see Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations;' Interna-
tional Organization, 40,1986,1. 
The final qualification to the absolute ability of states to opt out of international law 
is that most states seem to accept that in certain very limited cases fundamental inter-
national norms can apply to states that do not in any way consent to be bound by them. 
They hold that, regardless of consent, states can be bound by natural law (some con-
cept of absolute right) not to engage in certain basic wrongs. See, e.g., Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Article 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 (1969) 
(providing that a treaty is "void if ... it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law"). Peremptory norms are probably inclusive of core human rights 
standards. See Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) in International Law: 
Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status, Part III (Philadelphia: Coronet Books, 
1988). 
14. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July I, 1968, 
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. In 1995, India refused to agree to an extension of the 
nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Almost all of the nonnuclear weapons states have 
joined the nonproliferation treaty, which requires them to remain nonnuclear. The five 
nuclear weapons states party to the treaty have accepted the treaty's requirements that 
they eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons. Only India, Pakistan, Israel, and Cuba 
have not joined the global regime. Cuba is not thought to have nuclear weapons. Israel 
does, but has not declared itself to be a nuclear weapons state. Only India and Pakistan 
have tested nuclear weapons and declared their nuclear status. 
15. By using India's failure to adhere to the extension of the nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty, I do not mean to imply that India's arguments against the treaty were without 
validity. India argued that there had, in fact, not been a good faith effort on the part of 
the nuclear powers to meet the treaty's nuclear disarmament requirement and that the 
treaty, therefore, acted to legitimize a discriminatory state of affairs. India was particu-
larly concerned that China, with whom it shares a border and a history of tension, con-
tinued to retain such weapons. 
16. In May 1998, India conducted nuclear weapons tests and declared itself to be a nuclear 
weapons state. Fifteen days later, rival Pakistan, claiming it had no other strategic 
choice but to follow India's lead, conducted its own series of tests and also declared 
itself a nuclear power. For further discussion of the implications of this for regional and 
global security, see Strobe Talbott, "Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia;' Foreign 
Affairs, MarchI April, 1999, 110; "The Most Dangerous Place on Earth?" Economist, May 
22,1999,5. 
17. Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Con-
ference Parties, 3rd sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. FCCCICP/1997/L.7/Add. 1 (1997), 
reprinted in International Legal Materials 37, 1998,22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
My assertion that the United States is acting to "veto" the Kyoto Protocol needs 
some explanation. In December 1997, the United States joined 150 other countries in 
Kyoto, Japan, under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change to finalize 
negotiations over an agreement to provide for mandatory reductions in greenhouse 
gases. After difficult negotiations, a final agreement was reached tl1at provided a com-
prehensive plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions between 2008 and 2012. Devel-
oped countries are required by the protocol to reduce emissions significantly below 
1990 levels; however, the requirements for developing countries are far less stringent. 
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President Bill Clinton signed the protocol. Strong opposition to the treaty, however, 
developed within the United States Senate because of stated concerns over the lack of 
"meaningful participation" by developing countries and the impact of the treaty on the 
U.S. economy. President Clinton, therefore, did not present the treaty to that body for 
ratification, and instead attempted to negotiate with developing countries so that they 
might assume greater responsibility for the reduction of greenhouse gases. When Pres-
ident George W. Bush took office, he unconditionally rejected the Kyoto Protocol. 
While most other countries have also not yet ratified the convention, their reluc-
tance has not principally been opposition to the treaty but a desire to see what would 
happen in the United States. While it is certainly too soon to say that the United States 
has permanently defeated the treaty, and an ultimately stronger treaty with increased 
developing country participation might emerge, it is not clear that the U.S. Senate, 
unless ideologically reconstituted, will ever ratify the treaty. Certainly the United States 
is causing a delay in the full implementation of measures necessary to deal with the 
problem of global warming. 
18. For an overview of the Kyoto Protocol, see Claire Breidenich et al., "The Kyoto Protocol 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change," American Journal 
of International Law, 92,1998,315. 
19. See generally T. Houghton et al., eds., Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; World Meteorological Organization/United 
Nations Environment Programme Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
1990). For a technical examination of the problem of global warming, see S. George 
Philander, Is the Temperature Rising? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); 
Ed Ayres, God's Last Offer: Negotiating for a Sustainable Future (New York: Four Walls 
Eight Windows, 1999) . 
20. See Mike Dunn, "Conference to Affect State: Nations Will Gather to Discuss Global 
Warming:' Solutions, The Advocate, Nov. 30, 1997, lB. Realizing this, the protocol's 
drafters provided that the protocol needs to be ratified by fifty-five parties representing 
at least fifty-five percent of global carbon emissions in order to come into force. See 
Kyoto Protocol, Article 24 . 
21. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened 
for signature, March 1, 1980, G.A. Res. 341180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 
193, U.N. Doc.A/34/46 (1979), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, reprinted in International Legal Ma terials 
19 (33) (1980) (entered into force on Sept. 3, 1981). This convention has had a particularly 
large number of reservations. See William Schabas, "Reservations to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child:' William and Mary Journal of Women & Law, 3, 1997, 79. 
22. Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work 
of Equal Value (ILO Convention No. 100), June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303. The lan-
guage of the convention is so hedged that states are not bound to much of anything. 
See especially Article 2. 
23. Of course, this is not to imply that a claimed right of the assembly to impose law should 
or would be without limitations. Such a claimed power of the assembly to create or 
participate in creating binding law would only be likely to be accepted to the extent that 
it was constitutionally limited to matters within the proper scope of international deci-
sion making. 
24. Following World War II, the notion that at least certain international human rights and 
humanitarian norms apply not just to states, but also to individuals, began to gain 
acceptance. The watershed events were the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials and convic-
tions of individuals for wartime violations of international humanitarian and human 
rights law. See, e.g., Trial of War Criminals' Indictment 23, Department of State Publica-
tion no. 2420, 1945; Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. 472; "International 
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentences," American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 41, 1947, 172. In the last several years, the principle that certain interna-
tional humanitarian and human rights laws apply directly to individuals has come 
closer to becoming an enforceable reality. First, in 1993, the United Nations Security 
Council established an International Criminal Court at The Hague to try Balkan 
human rights and war crimes suspects. The Security Council followed in 1994 by 
establishing an affiliated court in Arusha to try Rwandan human rights and war crimes 
suspects. Both courts are presently in operation. See generally Louise Arbour, "History 
and Future of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda;' American University International Law Review, 13, 1998, 1495. Later, in the 
summer of 1997 in Rome a United Nations conference of states approved a draft con-
vention to establish for the first time a permanent international criminal court. Upon 
ratification by sixty countries the convention will go into effect. See generally Mah-
noush Arsanjani, "Developments in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court;' American Journal of International Law, 93, 1999, 22. 
Because of strong lobbying by the international human rights community (see Falk 
and Strauss, "On the Creation") and the horror and significantly destabilizing effects of 
the acts proscribed, the international community, with some major holdouts is in the 
process of providing an institutional mechanism for certain international criminal laws 
to be applied directly to citizens. Countries are, however, for the reasons discussed in 
this chapter, very unlikely to expand the scope of the applicability of international law 
to individuals beyond this narrow subject area. 
25. See Abram Chayes, "An Inquiry into the Working of Arms Control Agreements," Har-
vard Law Review, 85, 1972, 90S, 968; Fred IIde, How Nations Negotiate (New York: 
Praeger, 1964),8. Cf. Roger Fisher, "Bringing Law to Bear on Governments," Harvard 
Law Review, 74,1961,1130. 
26. Consistent with the bifurcation of the global system, both the domestic and interna-
tional orders have their own separate bodies of law, and each has its own distinctive 
law-applying institutions. International law is created by states through procedures 
that manifest their consent either explicitly through treaties or implicitly through cus-
tomary practice. See note 13. Domestic law, on the other hand, comes exclusively from 
the domestic system. In the United States, Congress, state legislatures, administrative 
agencies, and courts, to name a few, are all lawmaking institutions. International legal 
problems are largely resolved through international dispute resolution mechanisms, 
such as diplomacy, international arbitration, or the International Court of Justice, 
while domestic legal problems are thought to be largely resolved in national legal insti-
tutions, most notably domestic courts. See J. G. Starke, "Monism and Dualism in the 
Theory of International Law;' British Year Book of International Law, 17, 1936,66,68; 
Josef L. Kunz, "The 'Vienna School' and International Law," New York University Law 
Review, II, 1934,370,399; Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., edited 
by Robert W. Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1966) 446-447. 
27. See 'The Paquete Habana," 175 U.S. (1900),677,700 ("[Ilnternationallaw is part of 
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropri-
ate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for 
tl1eir determination"). Not all international law, however, is incorporated into United 
States law. Only what are called "self-executing" treaties and other "self-executing" 
international agreements, as well as customary international law that is appropriate for 
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application by domestic courts, are incorporated. All other international law is limited 
to application in international fora. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, Section 111 (3) and commentary c (American Law Institute, 
1987). 
28. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Supremacy Clause of the United States COl)sti-
tution (U.S. Const. Article VI, Section 2) to support the equal status of self-executing 
treaties and statutes and consequently has endorsed application of the later-in-time 
rule. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887) ("By the Constitution, a tr~aty 
is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation . 
Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no sll.pe-
rior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, 
the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can 
be done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the 
one last in date will control the other ... "). 
While the Constitution does not directly address the matter, and there is no case law 
directly on the point, it is most consistent with the overall framework for the American 
application of international law described in the text that the later-in-time rule should 
also apply to customary international law. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States, Section 115, reporter's note 4 ("arguably later customary 
law should be given effect as law of the United States, even in the face of earlier la\\l"); 
see also Louis Henkin, "International Law as Law in the United States," Michigan l.aw 
Review, 82, 1984, 1555, 1562-1564 (customary international law should be given 
authority equal to United States federal law). 
29. The extent to which the president acting on his own authority can witl1in this Ameri-
can compliance structure command citizens to act contrary to international law 
remains unclear. Authority for him to do so has been read into the Supreme Court's 
dictum that courts will give effect to international law "where tl1ere is no treaty, and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision." The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. 1900,677,700 (emphasis added). But see Louis Henkin, "The Constitution and 
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny," 100 Har-
vard Law Review, 100, 1987, 853, 879. "Unlike Congress, the President has no general 
authority to make law that might compete with international law as law of the United 
States. The President's duty is to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' a dllty 
that applies to international law as well as to other law of the land." Ibid. 
30. In addition to the fact that in every domestic legal system individuals are always per-
sonally obligated to follow the law, as agents of a corporation or otherwise, the Ameri-
can legal system, for example, has developed several additional ways of enhancing the 
power of the external law to encourage compliance by real persons operating wiiliin 
ilie corporate structure. For example, racketeering laws can be used to impose extra 
severe penalties for committing a crime on behalf of an organization. In addition, 
managers can be held strictly liable under, for example, certain federal environmental 
laws for the workplace violation of those laws by subordinate employees. See generally 
Joseph G. Block and Nancy A. Voison, "The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine-
Can You Go to Jail for What You Don't Know?" Environmental Law, 22,1992,1347. This 
principle of strict liability for corporate managers was upheld by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), and United States v. Dotterweich, 
320 U.S. 277 (1943). Likewise, the American system allows shareholders to sue directors 
derivatively to enjoin action in, or recover damages for, violation of law. See Miller v. 
AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that the business judgment rule cannot 
insulate directors from liability for criminal acts). 
See note 24. 
U.N. Charter, Articles 31-51. 
Ibid., Article 41. 
34. Ibid., Article 42. 
35. Ibid., Article 39. Article 39 reads in its entirety as follows: "The Security Council shall 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 [relating to economic sanctions and severance of diplo-
matic relations] and 42 [relating to military force], to maintain or restore international 
peace and security." 
36. If the WTO's dispute resolution system determines a party to be in violation of an 
agreement governed by the WTO and that party refuses to comply with that determi-
nation or pay compensation to the aggrieved party, then the aggrieved party "may 
request authorization from the [Dispute Settlement Body] to suspend the application 
to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agree-
ments." Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Article 22, Paragraph 2, Apr. 15, 1994; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, International Legal Materials, 33,1994,1125. 
37. See Constitution of the International Labor Organization, June 28, 1919, Articles 3 and 
4, 49 Stat. 2712, revised through Oct. 9, 1946; 62 Stat. 3485, T.LA.S. No. 1868, 15 
U.N.T.S. 35, amended, June 25,1953; 7 U.S.T. 245, T.LA.S. No. 3500, 191 U.N.T.S. 143, 
amended, June 22,1962; 14 U.S.T. 1039, T.LA.S. No. 5401, 466 U.N.T.S. 323, amended, 
June 22, 1972; 25 U.S.T. 3253, T.LA.S. No. 7987. The main elements of the ILO supervi-
sory machinery that allow for such critical oversight include the following: (1) a 
reporting system that requires for states that have ratified conventions to provide regu-
lar reports on their implementation (Articles 19,22); (2) "special constitutional proce-
dures" allowing associations of workers or employers (Article 24) or other states (Arti-
cle 26) to file complaints against states for failing to implement ratified conventions, 
and procedures for investigating and reporting on such complaints (Articles 27-30) 
and (3) the ILO's procedures for freedom of association which provides for the investi-
gation of interferences with the rights of workers to organize (Articles 24-30) . For fur-
ther discussion, see generally Virginia A. Leary, "Lessons from the Experience of the 
International Labour Organisation:' The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical 
Appraisal, edited by Philip Alston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 580; Nicolas Valti-
cos and Geraldo von Potobsky, International Labour Law, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1995). It should be noted that, germane to our discussion, the ILO is unique among 
international organizations in that citizen groups, specifically labor unions and indus-
try associations, are along with states officially represented in what is referred to as its 
tripartite structure. Human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, 
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 6 LL.M. 368, also employ a similar type of supervisory system 
as a way of "mobilizing shame" to secure enforcement. See generally Anne Fagan Gin-
ger, "The Energizing Effect of Enforcing a Human Rights Treaty:' DePaul Law Review, 
42, 1993, 1341. 
38. Trade sanctions authorized by the World Trade Organization (see note 36) are actually 
well designed to provide a measure of deterrence. The aggrieved party, who may decide 
against which commercial sector to impose trade restrictions, is most likely to choose 
one with significant domestic political clout. That way the target government will be 
placed under maximum internal pressure to adhere to its trade obligations. 
39. Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., Enforcing Restraint (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign 
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Relations, 1993). For a piece devoted specifically to the problem of collective punish-
ment and the Iraqi sanctions regime, see Michael Sklaire, Note, "The Security Council 
Blockade of Iraq: Conflicting Obligations under the United Nations Charter and the 
Fourth Geneva Convention;' American University Journal of International Law and Pol-
icy, 6,1991,609,624, 635. Numerous international humanitarian law and human rights 
conventions prohibit collective punishment. Among provisions in humanitarian con-
ventions, see Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3517, 
3538-3540, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 308- 10 (prohibiting punishment of a person "for an 
offense he or she has not personally committed"). See also Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, Pro-
tocol I, Article 75(2)(d), International Legal Materials, 16, 1978, 1391, 1423 (prohibiting 
collective punishment of persons under the control of a party to a conflict) ; Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 
Dec. 12, 1977, Protocol II, Article 4(2)(B), 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1444 (prohibiting collective 
punishments of persons not taking part in hostilities). See generally Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, [1991] 2(2) 
Year Book of the International Law Commission 1, 104-105, UN. Doc. A/CN.4/ SER. 
AI1991/Add.l (Part 2) (identifying collective punishment as an exceptionally serious 
war crime) . While the term "collective punishment" is not used in international human 
rights instruments, it is clearly prohibited by core provisions of such instruments. 
Implicit, for example, in provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights such 
as the right "to equal protection of the law" (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Article 7, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Part 1, at 71, UN. Doc. A/810 (1948) 
[hereinafter UDHR]), the right to be free of arbitrary arrest, detention, or execution 
(UDHR, Article 9) and the right "to be presumed innocent until proved guilty" 
(UDHR, Article 11) is that individuals should not be held accountable for wrongdoings 
that they did not commit. Other major human rights instruments provide similarly. 
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, note 37 here, especially Arti-
cles 6(1), 9(1),14(1)(2)(3), and 26; European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,213 UN.T.S. 221, especially Articles 
5(1)(a)(b)(c) and 6(2)(3); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, International Legal Materials, 9,1971, especially Article 5(3) ("pun-
ishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal"). 
40. See, e.g., Bruce Russett and James Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World Order;' Foreign 
Affairs, Spring 1991,69,75. 
41. Estimates of the number of Iraqi soldiers killed have varied widely. The Pentagon's 
Defense Intelligence Agency estimated in 1991 (with a self-proclaimed error factor of 
fifty percent or higher) that approximately 100,000 Iraqi military personnel were killed 
in action. See Barton Gellman, "One Year Later: War's Faded Triumph; Oil Flows, but 
Saddam Endures and New World Order Is Elusive," Washington Post, Jan. 16, 1992, AI. 
Other subsequent estimates have been much lower. See U.S. News & World Report, Tri-
umph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: 
Times Books, 1992), ix (estimating that approximately 8,000 Iraqis were killed); John 
Heidenrich, "The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?" Foreign Policy, Spring 1993, 108, 
124 (arguing that number killed may have been as low as 1,500). 
42. See Julian Borger, "Iraq: The Next Moves: Saddam's Elite Rides High Despite UN. 
Sanctions;' Guardian, Mar. 3,1998, 12. 
43. See Alan Dowty, "Sanctioning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order," Washington 
Quarterly, Summer 1994, 179 (reporting that the post-Gulf War U.N. sanctions regime 
have had "considerable impact on Iraq [in economic terms] without producing the 
desired political effect"). 
44. See Sarah Zaidi and Mary Smith-Fawzi, The Lancet, 346, 1995, 1485 (reporting on the 
1995 Food and Agricultural Organization study finding that post-Gulf War sanctions 
were responsible for the deaths of 567,000 Iraqi children); Barbara Crossette, "Unicef 
Head Says Thousands of Children are Dying in Iraq;' New York Times, Oct. 29, 1996, A8 
(reporting that, according the 1995 UNICEF report, 4,500 children under the age of 
five were dying every month in Iraq from hunger and disease). These figures have been 
very controversial. The question has been highly politicized and the methodologies in 
these studies have been questioned, along with their reliance on official Iraqi informa-
tion sources. See George Lopez and David Cortright, "Counting the Dead;' Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists, May/June 1998,39. Whatever the exact number of dead, however, it 
has been clear to all observers that the Iraqi sanctions regime has inflicted tremendous 
hardship on the Iraqi civilian population. 
45. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, "The Place of Law in Collective Security," Michigan 
Journal of International Law, 17, 1996, 455. 
46. See S.c. Res. 678, 263 mtg., International Legal Materials, 29, 1990, 1565. 
47. Other countries participating under United States command are Australia, Belgium, 
Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. See Barbara Crossette, "illegal 
Iraqi Oil Shipments Increase, U.S. Says;' New York Times, Nov. 19, 1997, A8. While the 
post-Gulf War weapons inspectors, who were responsible for monitoring Iraqi compli-
ance with the requirement that it eliminate its weapons of mass destruction, worked 
for the United Nations, even they found themselves relying heavily upon national intel-
ligence agencies for information. See generally Scott Ritter, End Game: Solving the Iraq 
Problem-Once and for All (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). 
48. Among such proposals has been one to establish a small standing army under the aus-
pices of the United Nations. See David Boren, "The World Needs an Army on Call;' 
New York Times, Aug. 26,1992, A21; Alan K. Henrikson, "How Can the Vision of a 'New 
World Order' Be Realized;' Fletcher Forum World Affairs, Winter 1992, 63, 76; Editorial, 
"A Foreign Legion for the World," New York Times, Sept. 1, 1992, A16. 
49. See generally Falk and Strauss, "On the Creation." In many ways the present analysis 
takes up where that paper leaves off. The central aim of our joint work is to argue that 
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50. See generally Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
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ers under the United Nations Charter are largely precatory. For further elaboration, see 
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